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A FRAMEWORK OF COOPETITIVE GAMES:
APPLICATIONS TO THE GREEK CRISIS
DAVID CARFI` ab∗ AND DANIELE SCHILIRO` b
ABSTRACT. In the present work we propose an original analytical model of coopetitive
game. We shall apply this analytical model of coopetition (based on normal form game
theory) to the Greek crisis, while conceiving this game theory model at a macro level.
We construct two realizations of such model, trying to represent possible realistic macro-
economic scenarios of the Germany-Greek strategic interaction. We shall suggest - after
a deep and complete study of the two samples - feasible transferable utility solutions in
a properly coopetitive perspective for the divergent interests which drive the economic
policies in the euro area.
1. Introduction
Greece, a country that represents just over 2% of gross domestic product of the Euro
area, has led to a deep and widespread crisis in Europe. The Greek economy is locked
into a serious and difficult crisis, due to its lack of competitiveness and is still at risk of
insolvency, because of its public finance mismanagement. Although the EU Governments
and the IMF have provided substantial financial assistance to cover the refinancing needs
of Greece in exchange of a serious and though austerity program, and even, the banks
have agreed a heavy haircut on the Greek debts, the Greek economy is still on the brink of
collapse. Germany, on the other hand, is the most competitive economy of the Euro Area
and has a large trade surplus with Greece and other Euro partners; hence significant trade
imbalances occur within the Euro Area.
The main purpose of our paper is to explore win-win solutions for Greece and Germany,
involving a German increasing demand of a pre-determined Greek exports. We do not
analyze the causes of the financial crisis in Greece and its relevant political and institutional
effects on the European Monetary Union. Rather we concentrate on stability and growth,
which should drive the economic policy of Greece and the other Euro countries.
The paper is organized as follows:
• Section 2 examines the Greek crisis, suggesting a possible way out to reduce the
intra-eurozone imbalances through coopetitive solutions within a growth path.∗
∗Section 2 of this paper has been written by D. Schiliro` while sections from 3 to 7 are due to D. Carfı`, however,
in strict joint cooperation. Abstract, introduction and conclusions were written by both authors, together.
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• Section 3 presents the original model of coopetitive game introduced in the litera-
ture by D. Carfı`.
• Section 4 proposes possible solutions concepts for the original model of coopeti-
tive game.
• Section 5, very briefly, provides the general ideas we follow, in this paper, for the
applications of coopetitive games to the Eurozone context.
• Section 6 provides a first sample of coopetitive game applied to the Eurozone con-
text, showing possible coopetitive solutions; we propose the first sample in an in-
tentionally simplified fashion (without direct strategic interactions among players)
to emphasize the new role and procedures of coopetition.
• Section 7 provides a second sample of coopetitive game applied to the Eurozone
context, showing possible coopetitive solutions; we propose a linear model, with
a direct strategic interactions among players.
• Conclusions end up the paper.
2. The Greek Crisis and the coopetitive solution
The deep financial crisis of Greece, which was almost causing the default of its sov-
ereign debt, has revealed the weaknesses of Greek economy, particularly its lack of com-
petitiveness, but also the mismanagement of the public finance and the difficulties of the
banking sector.
2.1. The crisis and the Greek economy. With the outbreak of the global crisis of 2008-
2009, Greece relied on state spending to drive growth, so the country has accumulated
a huge public debt. This has created deep concerns about its fiscal sustainability, and
its financial exposition has prevented the Greek government to find capitals in the financial
markets. In addition, Greece has lost competitiveness since joining the European Monetary
Union and, because of that, Greek’s unit labor cost rose over 30 percent from 2000 to 2010.
The austerity measures implemented by the Greek government are hitting hard the Greek
economy, since its growth is continuing to be expected negative also this year (2012), mak-
ing the financial recovery very problematic [Mussa (2010)]. Furthermore, Greece exports
are much less than imports, so the trade balance shows a deficit above 10% of its GDP.
Therefore, the focus of economic policy of Greece should become its productive system
and growth must be the major goal for the Greek economy in a medium term perspective.
This surely would help its re-equilibrium process.
2.2. The soundest European economy: Germany. Germany, on the other hand, is con-
sidered the soundest European economy. It is the world’s second-biggest exporter, but its
wide commercial surplus is originated mainly by the exports in the Euro area, that accounts
for about two thirds. Furthermore, since 2000 its export share has gradually increased vis-
a`-vis industrial countries. Thus Germany’s growth path has been driven by exports. We do
not discuss in this work the factors explaining Germany’s increase in export share, but we
observe that its international competitiveness has been improving, with the unit labor cost
which has been kept fairly constant, since wages have essentially kept pace with produc-
tivity. Therefore the prices of the German products have been relatively low, favoring the
export of German goods towards the euro countries and towards the markets around the
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world, especially those of the emerging economies (China, India, Brazil, Russia). Finally,
since 2010 Germany has recovered very well from the 2008-2009 global crisis and it is
growing at a higher rate than the others Euro partners.
Therefore we share the view that Germany (and the other surplus countries of the Euro
area) should contribute to overcome the crisis of Greek economy stimulating its demand of
goods from Greece and relying less on exports towards the Euro area in general. Germany,
as some economists as Posen [2010] and Abadi [2010] underlined, has benefited from
being the anchor economy for the Eurozone over the last 11 years. For instance, in 2009,
during a time of global contraction, Germany has been a beneficiary, being able to run a
sustained trade surplus with its European neighbors. Germany is exporting to Greece far
more than it imports.
2.3. A win-win solution for Greece and Germany. Thus we believe that an economic
policy that aims at adjusting government budget and trade imbalances and looks at improv-
ing the growth path of the real economy in the medium and long term in Greece is the only
possible one to assure a stable re-balancing of the Greek economy and also to contribute to
the stability of the whole euro area [Schiliro`, 2011]. As we have already argued, German
modest wage increases and weak domestic demand favored the export of German goods
towards the euro countries. We suggest, in accordance with Posen [2010], a win-win so-
lution (a win-win solution is the outcome of a game which is designed in a way that all
participants can profit from it in one way or the other), which entails that Germany, which
still represents the leading economy, should re-balance its trade surplus and thus ease the
pressure on the southern countries of the euro area, particularly Greece. Obviously, we are
aware that this is a mere hypothesis and that our framework of coopetition is a normative
model. However, we believe that a cooperative attitude must be taken within the members
of the European monetary union. Thus we pursue our hypothesis and suggest a model
of coopetitive game as an innovative instrument to analyze possible solutions to obtain a
win-win outcome for Greece and Germany, which would also help the whole economy of
the euro area.
2.4. Our coopetitive model. The two strategic variables of our model are investments and
exports for Greece, since this country must concentrate on them to improve the structure
of production and its competitiveness, but also shift its aggregate demand towards a higher
growth path in the medium term. Thus Greece should focus on innovative investments,
specially investments in knowledge [Schiliro`, 2010], to change and improve its production
structure and to increase its production capacity and its productivity. As a result of that
its competitiveness will improve. An economic policy that focuses on investments and
exports, instead of consumptions, will address Greece towards a sustainable growth and,
consequently, its financial reputation and economic stability will also increase. On the
other hand, the strategic variable of our model for Germany are private consumption and
imports.
The idea which is driving our model to solve the Greek crisis is based on a notion of
coopetition where the cooperative aspect will prevail. Thus we are not talking about a sit-
uation in which Germany and Greece are competing in the same European market for the
same products, rather we are assuming a situation in which Germany stimulates its domes-
tic demand and, in doing so, will create a larger market for products from abroad. We are
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also envisaging the case where Germany purchases a greater quantity of Greek products,
in this case Greece increases its exports, selling more products to Germany. The final re-
sults will be that Greece will find itself in a better position, but also Germany will get an
economic advantage determined by the higher growth in the two countries. In addition,
there is the important advantage of a greater stability within the European Monetary sys-
tem. Finally our model will provide a new set of tools based on the notion of coopetition,
that could be fruitful for the setting of the euro area economic policy issues.
2.5. The coopetition in our model. The concept of coopetition was essentially devised at
micro-economic level for strategic management solutions by Brandenburger and Nalebuff
[1995], who suggest, given the competitive paradigm [Porter, 1985], to consider also a co-
operative behavior to achieve a win-win outcome for both players. Therefore, in our model,
coopetition represents the synthesis between the competitive paradigm [Porter, 1985] and
the cooperative paradigm [Gulati, Nohria, Zaheer, 2000; Stiles, 2001]. Coopetition is, in
our approach, a complex theoretical construct and it is the result of the interplay between
competition and cooperation. Thus, we suggest a model of coopetitive games, applied at
a macroeconomic level, which intends to offer possible solutions to the partially divergent
interests of Germany and Greece in a perspective of a cooperative attitude that should drive
their policies.
3. Coopetitive games
3.1. Introduction. In this paper we develop and apply the mathematical model of a coopet-
itive game introduced by David Carfı` in [11] and [6]. The idea of coopetitive game is al-
ready used, in a mostly intuitive and non-formalized way, in Strategic Management Studies
(see for example Brandenburgher and Nalebuff).
3.1.1. The idea. A coopetitive game is a game in which two or more players (participants)
can interact cooperatively and non-cooperatively at the same time. Even Brandenburger
and Nalebuff, creators of coopetition, did not define, precisely, a quantitative way to im-
plement coopetition in the Game Theory context.
The problem to implement the notion of coopetition in Game Theory is summarized in
the following question:
• how do, in normal form games, cooperative and non-cooperative interactions can
live together simultaneously, in a Brandenburger-Nalebuff sense?
In order to explain the above question, consider a classic two-player normal-form gain
game G = (f,>) - such a game is a pair in which f is a vector valued function defined
on a Cartesian product E × F with values in the Euclidean plane R2 and > is the natural
strict sup-order of the Euclidean plane itself (the sup-order is indicating that the game, with
payoff function f , is a gain game and not a loss game). Let E and F be the strategy sets of
the two players in the game G. The two players can choose the respective strategies x ∈ E
and y ∈ F
• cooperatively (exchanging information and making binding agreements);
• not-cooperatively (not exchanging information or exchanging information but with-
out possibility to make binding agreements).
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The above two behavioral ways are mutually exclusive, at least in normal-form games:
• the two ways cannot be adopted simultaneously in the model of normal-form game
(without using convex probability mixtures, but this is not the way suggested by
Brandenburger and Nalebuff in their approach);
• there is no room, in the classic normal form game model, for a simultaneous (non-
probabilistic) employment of the two behavioral extremes cooperation and non-
cooperation.
3.1.2. Towards a possible solution. Firstly David Carfı` in [6] and then D. Carfı` with D.
Schiliro` in [11] have proposed a manner to overcome this impasse, according to the idea
of coopetition in the sense of Brandenburger and Nalebuff. In a Carfı`’s coopetitive game
model,
• the players of the game have their respective strategy-sets (in which they can
choose cooperatively or not cooperatively);
• there is a common strategy set C containing other strategies (possibly of differ-
ent type with respect to those in the respective classic strategy sets) that must be
chosen cooperatively;
• the strategy set C can also be structured as a Cartesian product (similarly to the
profile strategy space of normal form games), but in any case the strategies be-
longing to this new set C must be chosen cooperatively.
3.2. The model for n-players. We give in the following the definition of coopetitive game
proposed by Carfı` (in [11] and [6]).
Definition (of n-player coopetitive game). Let E = (Ei)ni=1 be a finite n-family of
non-empty sets and let C be another non-empty set. We define n-player coopetitive gain
game over the strategy support (E,C) any pair G = (f,>), where f is a vector function
from the Cartesian product ×E × C (here ×E denotes the classic strategy-profile space
of n-player normal form games, i.e. the Cartesian product of the family E) into the n-
dimensional Euclidean space Rn and > is the natural sup-order of this last Euclidean
space. The element of the set C will be called cooperative strategies of the game.
A particular aspect of our coopetitive game model is that any coopetitive game G de-
termines univocally a family of classic normal-form games and vice versa; so that any
coopetitive game could be defined as a family of normal-form games. In what follows we
precise this very important aspect of the model.
Definition (the family of normal-form games associated with a coopetitive game).
Let G = (f,>) be a coopetitive game over a strategic support (E,C). And let
g = (gz)z∈C
be the family of classic normal-form games whose member gz is, for any cooperative strat-
egy z in C, the normal-form game
Gz := (f(., z), >),
where the payoff function f(., z) is the section
f(., z) : ×E → Rn
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of the function f , defined (as usual) by
f(., z)(x) = f(x, z),
for every point x in the strategy profile space ×E. We call the family g (so defined) family
of normal-form games associated with (or determined by) the gameG and we call normal
section of the game G any member of the family g.
We can prove this (obvious) theorem.
Theorem. The family g of normal-form games associated with a coopetitive game G
uniquely determines the game. In more rigorous and complete terms, the correspondence
G → g is a bijection of the space of all coopetitive games - over the strategy support
(E,C) - onto the space of all families of normal form games - over the strategy support E
- indexed by the set C.
Proof. This depends totally from the fact that we have the following natural bijection
between function spaces:
F(×E × C,Rn)→ F(C,F(×E,Rn)) : f → (f(., z))z∈C ,
which is a classic result of theory of sets. 
Thus, the exam of a coopetitive game should be equivalent to the exam of a whole
family of normal-form games (in some sense we shall specify).
In this paper we suggest how this latter examination can be conducted and what are the
solutions corresponding to the main concepts of solution which are known in the literature
for the classic normal-form games, in the case of two-player coopetitive games.
3.3. Two players coopetitive games. In this section we specify the definition and related
concepts of two-player coopetitive games; sometimes (for completeness) we shall repeat
some definitions of the preceding section.
Definition (of coopetitive game). Let E, F and C be three nonempty sets. We define
two player coopetitive gain game carried by the strategic triple (E,F,C) any pair of the
form G = (f,>), where f is a function from the Cartesian product E × F × C into the
real Euclidean plane R2 and the binary relation > is the usual sup-order of the Cartesian
plane (defined component-wise, for every couple of points p and q, by p > q iff pi > qi,
for each index i).
Remark (coopetitive games and normal form games). The difference among a two-
player normal-form (gain) game and a two player coopetitive (gain) game is the funda-
mental presence of the third strategy Cartesian-factor C. The presence of this third set
C determines a total change of perspective with respect to the usual exam of two-player
normal form games, since we now have to consider a normal form game G(z), for every
element z of the set C; we have, then, to study an entire ordered family of normal form
games in its own totality, and we have to define a new manner to study these kind of game
families.
3.4. Terminology and notation. Definitions. Let G = (f,>) be a two player coopetitive
gain game carried by the strategic triple (E,F,C). We will use the following terminolo-
gies:
• the function f is called the payoff function of the game G;
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• the first component f1 of the payoff function f is called payoff function of the first
player and analogously the second component f2 is called payoff function of the
second player;
• the set E is said strategy set of the first player and the set F the strategy set of
the second player;
• the set C is said the cooperative (or common) strategy set of the two players;
• the Cartesian product E × F ×C is called the (coopetitive) strategy space of the
game G.
Memento. The first component f1 of the payoff function f of a coopetitive game G is
the function of the strategy space E×F ×C of the game G into the real line R defined by
the first projection
f1(x, y, z) := pr1(f(x, y, z)),
for every strategic triple (x, y, z) in E × F × C; in a similar fashion we proceed for the
second component f2 of the function f .
Interpretation. We have:
• two players, or better an ordered pair (1, 2) of players;
• anyone of the two players has a strategy set in which to choose freely his own
strategy;
• the two players can/should cooperatively choose strategies z in a third common
strategy set C;
• the two players will choose (after the exam of the entire game G) their cooperative
strategy z in order to maximize (in some sense we shall define) the vector gain
function f .
3.5. Normal form games of a coopetitive game. LetG be a coopetitive game in the sense
of above definitions. For any cooperative strategy z selected in the cooperative strategy
space C, there is a corresponding normal form gain game
Gz = (p(z), >),
upon the strategy pair (E,F ), where the payoff function p(z) is the section
f(., z) : E × F → R2,
of the payoff function f of the coopetitive game - the section is defined, as usual, on the
competitive strategy space E × F , by
f(., z)(x, y) = f(x, y, z),
for every bi-strategy (x, y) in the bi-strategy space E × F .
Let us formalize the concept of game-family associated with a coopetitive game.
Definition (the family associated with a coopetitive game). Let G = (f,>) be a two
player coopetitive gain game carried by the strategic triple (E,F,C). We naturally can
associate with the game G a family g = (gz)z∈C of normal-form games defined by
gz := Gz = (f(., z), >),
for every z in C, which we shall call the family of normal-form games associated with
the coopetitive game G.
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Remark. It is clear that with any above family of normal form games
g = (gz)z∈C ,
with gz = (f(., z), >), we can associate:
• a family of payoff spaces
(imf(., z))z∈C ,
with members in the payoff universe R2;
• a family of Pareto maximal boundary
(∂∗Gz)z∈C ,
with members contained in the payoff universe R2;
• a family of suprema
(supGz)z∈C ,
with members belonging to the payoff universe R2;
• a family of Nash zones
(N (Gz))z∈C ;
with members contained in the strategy space E × F ;
• a family of conservative bi-values
v# = (v#z )z∈C ;
in the payoff universe R2.
And so on, for every meaningful known feature of a normal form game. Moreover, we can
interpret any of the above families as set-valued paths in the strategy space E × F or in
the payoff universe R2.
It is just the study of these induced families which becomes of great interest in the
examination of a coopetitive game G and which will enable us to define (or suggest) the
various possible solutions of a coopetitive game.
4. Solutions of a coopetitive game
4.1. Introduction. The two players of a coopetitive game G - according to the general
economic principles of monotonicity of preferences and of non-satiation - should choose
the cooperative strategy z in C in order that:
• the reasonable Nash equilibria of the gameGz are f -preferable than the reasonable
Nash equilibria in each other game Gz′ ;
• the supremum of Gz is greater (in the sense of the usual order of the Cartesian
plane) than the supremum of any other game Gz′ ;
• the Pareto maximal boundary of Gz is higher than that of any other game Gz′ ;
• the Nash bargaining solutions in Gz are f -preferable than those in Gz′ ;
• in general, fixed a common kind of solution for any game Gz , say S(z) the set of
these kind of solutions for the game Gz , we can consider the problem to find all
the optimal solutions (in the sense of Pareto) of the set valued path S, defined on
the cooperative strategy set C. Then, we should face the problem of selection of
reasonable Pareto strategies in the set-valued path S via proper selection methods
(Nash-bargaining, Kalai-Smorodinsky and so on).
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Moreover, we shall consider the maximal Pareto boundary of the payoff space im(f) as an
appropriate zone for the bargaining solutions.
The payoff function of a two person coopetitive game is (as in the case of normal-form
game) a vector valued function with values belonging to the Cartesian plane R2. We note
that in general the above criteria are multi-criteria and so they will generate multi-criteria
optimization problems.
In this section we shall define rigorously some kind of solution, for two player coopet-
itive games, based on a bargaining method, namely a Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining type.
Hence, first of all, we have to precise what kind of bargaining method we are going to use.
4.2. Bargaining problems. In this paper, we shall propose and use the following original
extended (and quite general) definition of bargaining problem and, consequently, a natural
generalization of Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. In the economic literature, several examples
of extended bargaining problems and extended Kalai-Smorodinski solutions are already
presented. The essential root of these various extended versions of bargaining problems
is the presence of utopia points not-directly constructed by the disagreement points and
the strategy constraints. Moreover, the Kalai-type solution, of such extended bargaining
problems, is always defined as a Pareto maximal point belonging to the segment joining
the disagreement point with the utopia point (if any such Pareto point does exist): we
shall follow the same way. In order to find suitable new win-win solutions of our realistic
coopetitive economic problems, we need such new kind of versatile extensions. For what
concerns the existence of our new extended Kalai solutions, for the economic problems we
are facing, we remark that conditions of compactness and strict convexity will naturally
hold; we remark, otherwise, that, in this paper, we are not interested in proving general
or deep mathematical results, but rather to find reasonable solutions for new economic
coopetitive context.
Definition (of bargaining problem). Let S be a subset of the Cartesian plane R2 and
let a and b be two points of the plane with the following properties:
• they belong to the small interval containing S, if this interval is defined (in-
deed, it is well defined if and only if S is bounded and it is precisely the interval
[inf S, supS]≤ );
• they are such that a < b;
• the intersection
[a, b]≤ ∩ ∂∗S,
among the interval [a, b]≤ with end points a and b (it is the set of points greater
than a and less than b, it is not the segment [a, b]) and the maximal boundary of S
is non-empty.
In these conditions, we call bargaining problem on S corresponding to the pair of ex-
treme points (a, b), the pair
P = (S, (a, b)).
Every point in the intersection among the interval [a, b]≤ and the Pareto maximal boundary
of S is called possible solution of the problem P . Some time the first extreme point of a
bargaining problem is called the initial point of the problem (or disagreement point or
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threat point) and the second extreme point of a bargaining problem is called utopia point
of the problem.
In the above conditions, when S is convex, the problem P is said to be convex and for
this case we can find in the literature many existence results for solutions of P enjoying
prescribed properties (Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions, Nash bargaining solutions and so on
...).
Remark. Let S be a subset of the Cartesian plane R2 and let a and b two points of the
plane belonging to the smallest interval containing S and such that a ≤ b. Assume the
Pareto maximal boundary of S be non-empty. If a and b are a lower bound and an upper
bound of the maximal Pareto boundary, respectively, then the intersection
[a, b]≤ ∩ ∂∗S
is obviously not empty. In particular, if a and b are the extrema of S (or the extrema of the
Pareto boundary S∗ = ∂∗S) we can consider the following bargaining problem
P = (S, (a, b)), (or P = (S∗, (a, b)))
and we call this particular problem a standard bargaining problem on S (or standard bar-
gaining problem on the Pareto maximal boundary S∗).
4.3. Kalai solution for bargaining problems. Note the following property.
Property. If (S, (a, b)) is a bargaining problem with a < b, then there is at most one
point in the intersection
[a, b] ∩ ∂∗S,
where [a, b] is the segment joining the two points a and b.
Proof. Since if a point p of the segment [a, b] belongs to the Pareto boundary ∂∗S, no
other point of the segment itself can belong to Pareto boundary, since the segment is a
totally ordered subset of the plane (remember that a < b). 
Definition (Kalai-Smorodinsky). We call Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (or best com-
promise solution) of the bargaining problem (S, (a, b)) the unique point of the intersec-
tion
[a, b] ∩ ∂∗S,
if this intersection is non empty.
So, in the above conditions, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution k (if it exists) enjoys the
following property: there is a real r in [0, 1] such that
k = a+ r(b− a),
or
k − a = r(b− a),
hence
k2 − a2
k1 − a1 =
b2 − a2
b1 − a1 ,
if the above ratios are defined; these last equality is the characteristic property of Kalai-
Smorodinsky solutions.
We end the subsection with the following definition.
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Definition (of Pareto boundary). We call Pareto boundary every subset M of an
ordered space which has only pairwise incomparable elements.
4.4. Nash (proper) solution of a coopetitive game. Let N := N (G) be the union of the
Nash-zone family of a coopetitive game G, that is the union of the family (N (Gz))z∈C of
all Nash-zones of the game family g = (gz)z∈C associated to the coopetitive game G. We
call Nash path of the game G the multi-valued path
z → N (Gz)
and Nash zone of G the trajectory N of the above multi-path. Let N∗ be the Pareto maxi-
mal boundary of the Nash zone N . We can consider the bargaining problem
PN = (N∗, inf(N∗), sup(N∗)).
Definition. If the above bargaining problem PN has a Kalai-Smorodinsky solution k,
we say that k is the properly coopetitive solution of the coopetitive game G.
The term “properly coopetitive” is clear:
• this solution k is determined by cooperation on the common strategy set C and to
be selfish (competitive in the Nash sense) on the bi-strategy space E × F .
4.5. Bargaining solutions of a coopetitive game. It is possible, for coopetitive games, to
define other kind of solutions, which are not properly coopetitive, but realistic and some-
time affordable. These kind of solutions are, we can say, super-cooperative. Let us show
some of these kind of solutions.
Consider a coopetitive game G and
• its Pareto maximal boundary M and the corresponding pair of extrema (aM , bM );
• the Nash zone N (G) of the game in the payoff space and its extrema (aN , bN );
• the conservative set-value G# (the set of all conservative values of the family g
associated with the coopetitive game G) and its extrema (a#, b#).
We call:
• Pareto compromise solution of the game G the best compromise solution (K-S
solution) of the problem
(M, (aM , bM )),
if this solution exists;
• Nash-Pareto compromise solution of the game G the best compromise solution
of the problem
(M, (bN , bM ))
if this solution exists;
• conservative-Pareto compromise solution of the game G the best compromise of
the problem
(M, (b#, bM ))
if this solution exists.
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4.6. Transferable utility solutions. Other possible compromises we suggest are the fol-
lowing.
Consider the transferable utility Pareto boundary M of the coopetitive game G, that is
the set of all points p in the Euclidean plane (universe of payoffs), between the extrema of
G, such that their sum
+(p) := p1 + p2
is equal to the maximum value of the addition + of the real line R over the payoff space
f(E × F × C) of the game G.
Definition (TU Pareto solution). We call transferable utility compromise solution of
the coopetitive game G the solution of any bargaining problem (M, (a, b)), where
• a and b are points of the smallest interval containing the payoff space of G
• b is a point strongly greater than a;
• M is the transferable utility Pareto boundary of the game G;
• the points a and b belong to different half-planes determined by M .
Note that the above fourth axiom is equivalent to require that the segment joining the points
a and b intersect M .
4.7. Win-win solutions. In the applications, if the game G has a member G0 of its family
which can be considered as an “initial game” - in the sense that the pre-coopetitive situation
is represented by this normal form game G0 - the aims of our study (following the standard
ideas on coopetitive interactions) are
• to “enlarge the pie”;
• to obtain a win-win solution with respect to the initial situation.
So that we will choose as a threat point a in TU problem (M, (a, b)) the supremum of the
initial game G0.
Definition (of win-win solution). Let (G, z0) be a coopetitive game with an initial
point, that is a coopetitive gameG with a fixed common strategy z0 (of its common strategy
set C). We call the game Gz0 as the initial game of (G, z0). We call win-win solution of
the game (G, z0) any strategy profile s = (x, y, z) such that the payoff of G at s is strictly
greater than the supremum L of the payoff core of the initial game G(z0).
Remark 1. The payoff core of a normal form gain game G is the portion of the Pareto
maximal boundary G∗ of the game which is greater than the conservative bi-value of G.
Remark 2. From an applicative point of view, the above requirement (to be strictly
greater than L) is very strong. More realistically, we can consider as win-win solutions
those strategy profiles which are strictly greater than any reasonable solution of the initial
game Gz0 .
Remark 3. Strictly speaking, a win-win solution could be not Pareto efficient: it is
a situation in which the players both gain with respect to an initial condition (and this is
exactly the idea we follow in the rigorous definition given above).
Remark 4. In particular, observe that, if the collective payoff function
+(f) = f1 + f2
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has a maximum (on the strategy profile space S) strictly greater than the collective payoff
L1 + L2 at the supremum L of the payoff core of the game Gz0 , the portion M(> L)
of Transferable Utility Pareto boundary M which is greater than L is non-void and it
is a segment. So that we can choose as a threat point a in our problem (M, (a, b)) the
supremum L of the payoff core of the initial game G0 to obtain some compromise solution.
4.7.1. Standard win-win solution. A natural choice for the utopia point b is the supremum
of the portion M≥a of the transferable utility Pareto boundary M which is upon (greater
than) this point a:
M≥a = {m ∈M : m ≥ a}.
4.7.2. Non standard win-win solution. Another kind of solution can be obtained by choos-
ing b as the supremum of the portion of M that is bounded between the minimum and
maximum value of that player i that gains more in the coopetitive interaction, in the sense
that
max(pri(imf))−max(pri(imf0)) > max(pr3−i(imf))−max(pr3−i(imf0)).
4.7.3. Final general remarks. In the development of a coopetitive game, we consider:
• a first virtual phase, in which the two players make a binding agreement on what
cooperative strategy z should be selected from the cooperative set C, in order to
respect their own rationality.
• then, a second virtual phase, in which the two players choose their strategies form-
ing the profile (x, y) to implement in the game G(z).
Now, in the second phase of our coopetitive game G we consider the following 4 possibil-
ities:
(1) the two players are non-cooperative in the second phase and they do or do not
exchange info, but the players choose (in any case) Nash equilibrium strategies
for the game G(z); in this case, for some rationality reason, the two players have
devised that the chosen equilibrium is the better equilibrium choice in the entire
game G; we have here only one binding agreement in the entire development of
the game;
(2) the two players are cooperative also in the second phase and they make a binding
agreement in order to choose a Pareto payoff on the coopetitive Pareto boundary;
in this case we need two binding agreements in the entire development of the
game;
(3) the two players are cooperative also in the second phase and they make two binding
agreements, in order to reach the Pareto payoff (on the coopetitive Pareto bound-
ary) with maximum collective gain (first agreement) and to share the collective
gain according to a certain subdivision (second agreement); in this case we need
three binding agreements in the entire development of the game;
(4) the two players are non-cooperative in the second phase (and they do or do not ex-
change information), the player choose (in any case) Nash equilibrium strategies;
the two players have devised that the chosen equilibrium is the equilibrium with
maximum collective gain and they make only one binding agreement to share the
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collective gain according to a certain subdivision; in this case we need two binding
agreements in the entire development of the game.
5. Coopetitive games for Greek crisis
Our first hypothesis is that Germany must stimulate the domestic demand and to re-
balance its trade surplus in favor of Greece. The second hypothesis is that Greece, a
country with a declining competitiveness of its products and a small export share, aims
at growth by undertaking innovative investments and by increasing its exports primarily
towards Germany and also towards the other euro countries.
The coopetitive models that we propose hereunder must be interpreted as normative
models, in the sense that:
• they impose some clear a priori conditions to be respected, by binding contracts,
in order to enlarge the possible outcomes of both countries;
• consequently, they show appropriate win-win strategy solutions, chosen by con-
sidering both competitive and cooperative behaviors, simultaneously;
• finally, they propose appropriate fair divisions of the win-win payoff solutions.
The strategy spaces of the two models are:
• the strategy set of GermanyE, set of all possible consumptions of Germany, in our
model, given in a conventional monetary unit; we shall assume that the strategies
of Germany directly influence only Germany pay-off;
• the strategy set of Greece F , set of all possible investments of Greece, in our
model, given in a conventional monetary unit (different from the above Germany
monetary unit); we shall assume that the strategies of Greece directly influence
only Greece pay-off;
• a shared strategy set C, whose elements are determined together by the two coun-
tries, when they choose their own respective strategies x and y, Germany and
Greece. Every strategy z in C represents an amount - given in a third conventional
monetary unit - of Greek exports imported into Germany, by respecting a binding
contract.
Therefore, in the two models, we assume that Germany and Greece define the set of coopet-
itive strategies.
6. The first model
Main Strategic assumptions. We assume that:
• any real number x, belonging to the unit interval U := [0, 1], can represent a
consumption of Germany (given in an appropriate conventional monetary unit);
• any real number y, in the same unit interval U , can represent an investment of
Greece (given in another appropriate conventional monetary unit);
• any real number z, again in U , can be the amount of Greek exports which is
imported by Germany (given in conventional monetary unit).
6.1. Payoff function of Germany. We assume that the payoff function of Germany f1 is
its gross domestic demand:
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• f1 is equal to the private consumption function C1 plus the gross investment func-
tion I1 plus government spending (that we shall assume equal 0, or constant) plus
export function X1 minus the import function M1, that is
f1 = C1 + I1 +X1 −M1.
We assume that:
• the private consumption functionC1 is the first projection of the strategic Cartesian
cube U3, that is defined by
C1(x, y, z) = x,
for every consumption x in U , since we assume the private consumption of Ger-
many the first strategic component of strategy profiles in U3;
• the gross investment function I1 is constant on the cube U3, and by translation we
can suppose I1 equal zero;
• the export function X1 is defined by
X1(x, y, z) = (1 + x)
−1,
for every consumption x of Germany; so we assume that the export function X1
is a strictly decreasing function with respect to the first argument;
• the import function M1 is the third projection of the strategic cube, namely
M1(x, y, z) = z,
for every z ∈ U , because we assume the import function M1 depending only upon
the cooperative strategy z of the coopetitive gameG, our third strategic component
of the strategy profiles in U3.
Recap. We then assume as payoff function of Germany its gross domestic demand f1,
which in our model is equal, at every triple (x, y, z) in the strategic cube U3, to the sum
of the strategies x, −z with the export function X1, viewed as a reaction function with
respect to the German domestic consumption (so that f1 is the difference of the first and
third projection of the Cartesian product U3 plus the function export function X1).
Concluding, the payoff function of Germany is the function f1 of the cube U3 into the
real line R, defined by
f1(x, y, z) = x+ 1/(x+ 1)− z,
for every triple (x, y, z) in the cube U3; where the reaction function X1, defined from the
unit interval U into the real line R by
X1(x) = 1/(x+ 1),
for every consumption x of Germany in the interval U , is the export function of Germany
mapping the level x of consumption into the level X1(x) of German export corresponding
to that consumption level x.
The function X1 is a strictly decreasing function, and only this monotonicity is the
relevant property of X1 for our coopetitive model.
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6.2. Payoff function of Greece. We assume that the payoff function of Greece f2 is again
its gross domestic demand - private consumption C2 plus gross investment I2 plus govern-
ment spending (assumed to be 0) plus exports X2 minus imports M2),
f2 = C2 + I2 +X2 −M2.
We assume that:
• the function C2 is irrelevant in our analysis, since we assume the private consump-
tion independent from the choice of the strategic triple (x, y, z) in the cube U3, in
other terms we assume the function C2 constant on the cube U3 and by translation
we can suppose C2 itself equal zero;
• the function I2 is defined by
I2(x, y, z) = y + nz,
for every (x, y, z) in U3 (see later for the justification);
• the export function X2 is the linear function defined by
X2(x, y, z) = z +my,
for every (x, y, z) in U3 (see later for the justification);
• the function M2 is irrelevant in our analysis, since we assume the import function
independent from the choice of the triple (x, y, z) in U3, in other terms we as-
sume the import function M2 constant on the cube U3 and, by translation, we can
suppose the import M2 equal zero.
So the payoff function of Greece is the linear function f2 of the cube U3 into the real line
R, defined by
f2(x, y, z) = (y + nz) + (z +my) = (1 +m)y + (1 + n)z,
for every pair (x, y, z) in the strategic Cartesian cube U3.
We note that the function f2 does not depend upon the strategies x in U chosen by
Germany and that f2 is a linear function.
The definition of the functions investment I2 and export X2 must be studied deeply and
carefully, and are fundamental to find the win-win solution.
• For every investment strategy y in U , the term my represents the quantity (mon-
etary) effect of the Greek investment y on the Greek exports. In fact, the invest-
ments, specially innovative investments, contribute at improving the competitive-
ness of Greek goods, favoring the exports.
• For every cooperative strategy z in U , the term nz is the cross-effect of the coop-
erative variable z representing the additive level of investment required to support
the production of the production z itself.
• We assume the factors m and n strictly positive.
6.3. Payoff function of the game. We so have built up a coopetitive gain game with
payoff function given by
f(x, y, z) = (x+ 1/(x+ 1)− z, (1 +m)y + (1 + n)z) =
= (x+ 1/(x+ 1), (1 +m)y) + z(−1, 1 + n)
for every x, y, z in [0, 1].
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Figure 1. 3D representation of the initial game (f(., 0), <).
Figure 2. 3D representation of the initial game (f(., 0), <).
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6.4. Study of the game G = (f,>). Note that, fixed a cooperative strategy z in U , the
section game G(z) = (p(z), >) with payoff function p(z), defined on the square U × U
by
p(z)(x, y) = f(x, y, z),
is the translation of the game G(0) by the “cooperative” vector
v(z) = z(−1, 1 + n),
so that we can study the initial game G(0) and then we can translate the various informa-
tions of the game G(0) by the vector v(z).
So, let us consider the initial game G(0). The strategy square S = U2 of G(0) has
vertices 02, e1, 12 and e2, where 02 is the origin, e1 is the first canonical vector (1, 0), 12
is the sum of the two canonical vectors (1, 1) and e2 is the second canonical vector (0, 1).
6.5. Topological Boundary of the payoff space of G0. In order to determine the Pareto
boundary of the payoff space, we shall use the technics introduced by D. Carfı` in [5] and
used in [2],[7], [8], [9] and [10]. We have
p0(x, y) = (x+ 1/(x+ 1), (1 +m)y),
for every x, y in [0, 1]. The transformation of the side [0, e1] is the trace of the (parametric)
curve c : U → R2 defined by
c(x) = f(x, 0, 0) = (x+ 1/(x+ 1), 0),
that is the segment
[f(0), f(e1)] = [(1, 0), (3/2, 0)].
The transformation of the segment [0, e2] is the trace of the curve c : U → R2 defined by
c(y) = f(0, y, 0) = (1, (1 +m)y),
that is the segment
[f(0), f(e2)] = [(1, 0), (1, 1 +m)].
The transformation of the segment [e1, 12] is the trace of the curve c : U → R2 defined by
c(y) = f(1, y, 0) = (1 + 1/2, (1 +m)y),
that is the segment
[f(e1), f(12)] = [(3/2, 0), (3/2, 1 +m)].
Critical zone of G(0). The Critical zone of the game G(0) is empty. Indeed the Jaco-
bian matrix is
Jf (x, y) =

1 + (1 + x)−2 0
0 1 +m

,
which is invertible for every x, y in U .
Payoff space of the game G(0). So, the payoff space of the game G(0) is the transfor-
mation of topological boundary of the strategic square, that is the rectangle with vertices
f(0, 0), f(e1), f(1, 1) and f(e2).
Nash equilibria. The unique Nash equilibrium is the bistrategy (1, 1). Indeed,
1 + (1 + x)−2 > 0
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Figure 3. Initial payoff space of the game (f,<).
so the function f1 is increasing with respect to the first argument and analogously
1 +m > 0
so that the Nash equilibrium is (1, 1).
6.6. The payoff space of the coopetitive game G. The image of the payoff function f , is
the union of the family of payoff spaces
(impz)z∈C ,
that is the convex envelope of the union of the image p0(S) (S is the square U × U ) and
of its translation by the vector v(1), namely the payoff space p1(S): the image of f is an
hexagon with vertices f(0, 0), f(e1), f(1, 1) and their translations by v(1).
6.7. Pareto maximal boundary of payoff space of G. The Pareto sup-boundary of the
coopetitive payoffspace f(S) is the segment [P ′, Q′], where P ′ = f(1, 1) and
Q′ = P ′ + v(1).
Possibility of global growth. It is important to note that the absolute slope of the
Pareto (coopetitive) boundary is 1 + n. Thus the collective payoff f1 + f2 of the game is
not constant on the Pareto boundary and, therefore, the game implies the possibility of a
global growth.
Atti Accad. Pelorit. Pericol. Cl. Sci. Fis. Mat. Nat., Vol. 90, No. 1, A1 (2012) [32 pages]
A1-20 D. CARFI` AND D. SCHILIRO`
Figure 4. Payoff space of the game (f,<).
Trivial bargaining solutions. The Nash bargaining solution on the segment [P ′, Q′]
with respect to the infimum of the Pareto boundary and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining
solution on the segment [P ′, Q′], with respect to the infimum and the supremum of the
Pareto boundary, coincide with the medium point of the segment [P ′, Q′]. This solution is
not acceptable from Germany point of view, it is collectively better than the supremum of
G0 but it is disadvantageous for Germany (it suffers a loss!): this solution can be thought
as a rebalancing solution but it is not realistically implementable.
6.8. Transferable utility solution. In this coopetitive context it is more convenient to
adopt a transferable utility solution, indeed:
• the point of maximum collective gain on the whole of the coopetitive payoff space
is the point
Q′ = (1/2, 2 +m+ n).
6.8.1. Rebalancing win-win best compromise solution. Thus we propose a rebalancing
win-win kind of coopetitive solution, as it follows (in the case m = 0):
1. we consider the portion s of transferable utility Pareto boundary
M := (0, 5/2 + n) + R(1,−1),
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obtained by intersecting M itself with the strip determined (spanned by convexi-
fying) by the straight lines e2 + Re1 and
(2 + n)e2 + Re1,
these are the straight lines of maximum gain for Greece in games G(0) and G
respectively.
2. we consider the Kalai-Smorodinsky segment s′ of vertices (3/2, 1) - supremum of
the game G(0) - and the supremum of the segment s.
3. our best payoff coopetitive compromise is the unique pointK in the intersection of
segments s and s′, that is the best compromise solution of the bargaining problem
(s, (supG0, sup s)).
Figure 5. Two Kalai win-win solutions of the game (f,<), represented with n = 1/2.
6.9. Win-win solution. This best payoff coopetitive compromise K represents a win-win
solution with respect to the initial supremum (3/2, 1). So that, as we repeatedly said, also
Germany can increase its initial profit from coopetition.
Win-win strategy procedure. The win-win payoff K can be obtained (by chance) in a
properly coopetitive fashion in the following way:
• the two players agree on the cooperative strategy 1 of the common set C;
• the two players implement their respective Nash strategies of game G(1); the
unique Nash equilibrium of G(1) is the bistrategy (1, 1);
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• finally, they share the “social pie”
5/2 + n = (f1 + f2)(1, 1, 1),
in a cooperative fashion (by contract) according to the decomposition K.
7. The second model
In this second model, we consider a linear affine mutual interaction between Germany
and Greece, more adherent to the real state of the Euro-area.
Specifically, in opposition to the above first model:
• we consider an interaction between the two countries also at the level of their
non-cooperative strategies;
• we assume that Greece also should import (by contract) some German production;
• we assume, that the German revenue, given by the exportations in Greece of the
above production, is absorbed by the Germany bank system - in order to pay the
Greece debts with the German bank system - so that this money does not appear in
the payoff function of Germany (as possible gain) but only in the payoff function
of Greece (as a loss).
7.0.1. Main Strategic assumptions. We assume that:
• any real number x, belonging to the interval E := [0, 3], represents a possible
consumption of Germany (given in an appropriate conventional monetary unit);
• any real number y, in the same interval F := E, represents a possible investment
of Greece (given in another appropriate conventional monetary unit);
• any real number z, again in the interval C = [0, 2], can be the amount of Greek
exports which is imported by Germany (given in conventional monetary unit).
7.1. Payoff function of Germany. We assume that the payoff function of Germany f1 is
its Keynesian gross domestic demand:
• f1 is equal to the private consumption function C1 plus the gross investment func-
tion I1 plus government spending (that we shall assume equal 2, constant in our
interaction) plus export function X1 minus the import function M1, that is
f1 = 2 + C1 + I1 +X1 −M1.
We assume that:
• the German private consumption function C1 is the first projection of the strategic
coopetitive space S := E2 × C, that is defined by
C1(x, y, z) = x,
for every possible german consumption x in E, this because we assumed the pri-
vate consumption of Germany to be the first strategic component of strategy pro-
files in S;
• the gross investment function I1 is constant on the space S, and by translation we
can suppose I1 equal zero;
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• the export function X1 is defined by
X1(x, y, z) = −y/3,
for every Greek possible investment y in innovative technology; so we assume that
the export function X1 is a strictly decreasing function with respect to the second
argument;
• the import function M1 is the third projection of the strategic space, namely
M1(x, y, z) = z,
for every cooperative strategy z ∈ 2U , because we assume the import function
M1 depending only upon the cooperative strategy z of the coopetitive game G,
our third strategic component of the strategy profiles in S.
Recap. We then assume as payoff function of Germany its Keynesian gross domestic
demand f1, which in our model is equal, at every triple (x, y, z) in the profile strategy set S,
to the sum of the strategies x,−z with the export functionX1, viewed as a reaction function
to the Greece investments (so that f1 is the difference of the first and third projection of the
strategy profile space S plus the function export function X1).
Concluding, the payoff function of Germany is the function f1 of the set S into the real
line R, defined by
f1(x, y, z) = 2 + x− y/3− z,
for every triple (x, y, z) in the space S; where the reaction function X1, defined from the
space S into the real line R by
X1(x, y, z) = −y/3,
for every possible investment y of Greece in the interval 3U , is the export function of
Germany mapping the level y of Greece investment into the level X1(x, y, z) of German
export, corresponding to the Greece investment level y.
The functionX1 is a strictly decreasing function in the second argument, and this mono-
tonicity is a relevant property of X1 for our coopetitive model.
7.2. Payoff function of Greece. We assume that the payoff function of Greece f2 is again
its Keynesian gross domestic demand - private consumption C2 plus gross investment I2
plus government spending (assumed to be 2) plus exports X2 minus imports M2), so that
f2 = 2 + C2 + I2 +X2 −M2.
We assume that:
• the function C2 is irrelevant in our analysis, since we assume the Greek private
consumptions independent from the choice of the strategic triple (x, y, z) in the
space S; in other terms, we assume the function C2 constant on the space S and
by translation we can suppose C2 itself equal zero;
• the function I2 : S → R is defined by
I2(x, y, z) = y + nz,
for every (x, y, z) in S (see above for the justification);
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• the export function X2 is the linear function defined by
X2(x, y, z) = z +my,
for every (x, y, z) in S (see above for the justification);
• the function M2 is now relevant in our analysis, since we assume the import func-
tion, by coopetitive contract with Germany, dependent on the choice of the triple
(x, y, z) in S, specifically, we assume the import function M2 defined on the space
S by
M2(x, y, z) := −2x/3,
so, Greece too now, must import some German product, with value −2x/3 for
each possible German consumption x.
So, the payoff function of Greece is the linear function f2 of the space S into the real line
R, defined by
f2(x, y, z) = 2− 2x/3 + (y + nz) + (z +my) =
= 2− 2x/3 + (1 +m)y + (1 + n)z,
for every pair (x, y, z) in the strategic Cartesian space S.
We note that the function f2 depends now significantly upon the strategies x in E,
chosen by Germany, and that f2 is again a linear function.
We shall assume the factors m and n non-negative and equal respectively (only for
simplicity) to 0 and 1/2.
7.3. Payoff function of the game. We so have build up a coopetitive gain game with
payoff function f : S → R2, given by
f(x, y, z) = (2 + x− y/3− z, 2− 2x/3 + (1 +m)y + (1 + n)z) =
= (2, 2) + (x− y/3,−2x/3 + (1 +m)y) + z(−1, 1 + n),
for every (x, y, z) in [0, 3]2 × [0, 2].
7.4. Study of the second game G = (f,>). Note that, fixed a cooperative strategy z in
2U , the section game G(z) = (p(z), >) with payoff function p(z), defined on the square
E2 by
p(z)(x, y) := f(x, y, z),
is the translation of the game G(0) by the “cooperative” vector
v(z) = z(−1, 1 + n),
so that, we can study the initial game G(0) and then we can translate the various informa-
tions of the game G(0) by the vectors v(z), to obtain the corresponding information for
the game G(z).
So, let us consider the initial game G(0). The strategy square E2 of G(0) has vertices
02, 3e1, 32 and 3e2, where 02 is the origin of the plane R2, e1 is the first canonical vector
(1, 0), 32 is the vectors (3, 3) and e2 is the second canonical vector.
Atti Accad. Pelorit. Pericol. Cl. Sci. Fis. Mat. Nat., Vol. 90, No. 1, A1 (2012) [32 pages]
A FRAMEWORK OF COOPETITIVE GAMES: APPLICATIONS TO THE GREEK CRISIS A1-25
Figure 6. 3D representation of (f,<).
Figure 7. 3D representation of (f,<).
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Figure 8. 3D representation of (f,<).
7.5. Topological Boundary of the payoff space of G0. In order to determine the payoff
space of the linear game it is sufficient to transform the four vertices of the strategy square
(the game is an affine invertible game), the critical zone is empty.
7.5.1. Payoff space of the game G(0). So, the payoff space of the game G(0) is the trans-
formation of the topological boundary of the strategy square, that is the parallelogram with
vertices f(0, 0), f(3e1), f(3, 3) and f(3e2), as shown in Fig. 9.
7.5.2. Nash equilibria. The unique Nash equilibrium is the bistrategy (3, 3). Indeed, the
function f1 is linear increasing with respect to the first argument and analogously the func-
tion f2 is linear and increasing with respect to the second argument.
7.6. The payoff space of the coopetitive game G. The image of the payoff function f , is
the union of the family of payoff spaces
(impz)z∈C ,
that is the convex envelope of the union of the image p0(E2) and of its translation by the
vector v(2), namely the payoff space p2(E2): the image of f is an hexagon with vertices
f(0, 0), f(3e1), f(3, 3) and their translations by v(2), as shown below.
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B' = (4,3)
C' = (1,5)
D' = (2,2)
A' = (5,0)
Figure 9. Initial payoff space of the game (f,<).
7.7. Pareto maximal boundary of the payoff space of G. The Pareto sup-boundary
of the coopetitive payoff space f(S) is the union of the segments [A′, B′], [P ′, Q′] and
[Q′, C ′′], where P ′ = f(3, 3, 0) and
Q′ = P ′ + v(2).
7.7.1. Possibility of global growth. It is important to note that the absolute slopes of the
segments [A′, B′], [P ′, Q′] of the Pareto (coopetitive) boundary are strictly greater than 1.
Thus the collective payoff f1 + f2 of the game is not constant on the Pareto boundary and,
therefore, the game implies the possibility of a transferable utility global growth.
7.7.2. Trivial bargaining solutions. The Nash bargaining solution on the entire payoff
space, with respect to the infimum of the Pareto boundary and the Kalai-Smorodinsky
bargaining solution, with respect to the infimum and the supremum of the Pareto boundary,
are not acceptable for Germany: they are collectively (TU) better than the Nash payoff of
G0 but they are disadvantageous for Germany (it suffers a loss!): these solutions could be
thought as rebalancing solutions, but they are not realistically implementable.
7.8. Transferable utility solutions. In this coopetitive context it is more convenient to
adopt a transferable utility solution, indeed:
Atti Accad. Pelorit. Pericol. Cl. Sci. Fis. Mat. Nat., Vol. 90, No. 1, A1 (2012) [32 pages]
A1-28 D. CARFI` AND D. SCHILIRO`
B' = P' = (4,3)
C'
D' = (2,2)
A' = (5,0)
Q' = B'' = (2,6)
C'' = (-1,8)
D'' = (0,5)
Figure 10. Payoff space of the game (f,<).
• the point of maximum collective gain on the whole of the coopetitive payoff space
is the point Q′ = (2, 6).
7.8.1. Rebalancing win-win solution relative to maximum gain for Greece in G. Thus
we propose a rebalancing win-win coopetitive solution relative to maximum gain for Greece
in G, as it follows (in the case m = 0):
1. we consider the portion s of transferable utility Pareto boundary
M := Q′ + R(1,−1),
obtained by intersecting M itself with the strip determined (spanned by convexi-
fying) by the straight lines P ′ +Re1 and C ′′ +Re1, these are the straight lines of
Nash gain for Greece in the initial game G(0) and of maximum gain for Greece
in G, respectively.
2. we consider the Kalai-Smorodinsky segment s′ of vertices B′ - Nash payoff of the
game G(0) - and the supremum of the segment s.
3. our best payoff rebalancing coopetitive compromise is the unique point K in the
intersection of segments s and s′, that is the best compromise solution of the bar-
gaining problem (s, (B′, sup s)).
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Figure 11 shows the above extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solutionK and the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution K ′ of the classic bargaining problem (M,B′). It is evident that the distribution K
is a rebalancing solution in favor of Greece with respect to the classic solution K ′.
C'
D' = (2,2)
A' = (5,0)
Q' = B'' = (2,6)
C'' = (-1,8)
D'' = (0,5)
B' = P' = (4,3)
K
K'
Figure 11. Two Kalai win-win solutions of the game (f,<), represented with n = 1/2.
7.8.2. Rebalancing win-win solution relative to maximum Nash gain for Greece. We
propose here a more realistic rebalancing win-win coopetitive solution relative to maxi-
mum Nash gain for Greece in G, as it follows (again in the case m = 0):
1. we consider the portion s of transferable utility Pareto boundary
M := Q′ + R(1,−1),
obtained by intersecting M itself with the strip determined (spanned by convex-
ifying) by the straight lines P ′ + Re1 and Q′ + Re1, these are the straight lines
of Nash gain for Greece in the initial game G(0) and of maximum Nash gain for
Greece in G, respectively.
2. we consider the Kalai-Smorodinsky segment s′ of vertices B′ - Nash payoff of the
game G(0) - and the supremum of the segment s.
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3. our best payoff rebalancing coopetitive compromise is the unique point K in the
intersection of segments s and s′, that is the best compromise solution of the bar-
gaining problem (s, (B′, sup s)).
Figure 12 shows the above extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solutionK and the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution K ′ of the classic bargaining problem (M,B′). The new distribution K is a rebal-
ancing solution in favor of Greece, more realistic than the previous rebalancing solution.
C'
D' = (2,2)
A' = (5,0)
Q' = B'' = (2,6)
C'' = (-1,8)
D'' = (0,5)
B' = P' = (4,3)
K
K'
Figure 12. Two Kalai win-win solutions of the game (f,<), represented with n = 1/2.
7.9. Win-win solution. The payoff extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions K represent
win-win solutions, with respect to the initial Nash gain B′. So that, as we repeatedly said,
also Germany can increase its initial profit from coopetition.
7.9.1. Win-win strategy procedure. The win-win payoff K can be obtained in a properly
transferable utility coopetitive fashion, as it follows:
• the two players agree on the cooperative strategy 2 of the common set C;
• the two players implement their respective Nash strategies in the game G(2), so
competing a` la Nash; the unique Nash equilibrium of the game G(2) is the bistrat-
egy (3, 3);
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• finally, they share the “social pie”
(f1 + f2)(3, 3, 2),
in a transferable utility cooperative fashion (by binding contract) according to
the decomposition K.
8. Conclusions
In conclusion, we desire to stress that:
• the two samples of coopetitive game, provided in the present contribution, are
essentially normative models.
• our samples of coopetition have pointed out the strategies that could bring to win-
win solutions, in a transferable utility and properly cooperative perspective,
for Greece and Germany.
In this paper we propose:
• a properly coopetitive solution, which is not convenient for Germany, which is
the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution on the coopetitive Nash path, set of all
possible Nash equilibria of the coopetitive interaction.
• transferable utility and properly coopetitive solutions, which are convenient also
for Germany, which are also rebalancing for the Euro area.
• a new extended Kalai-Smorodinsky method, appropriate to determine rebalancing
partitions, for win-win solutions, on the transferable utility Pareto boundary of the
coopetitive game.
The solutions offered by our coopetitive model:
• aim at “enlarging the pie and sharing it fairly”;
• show win-win and rebalancing outcomes, for the two countries, within a coopeti-
tive and positive non constant-sum game path.
• allow us to find “fair” amounts of Greek exports which Germany must coopera-
tively import as well as the optimal Greek investments necessary to improve the
Greek economy in this context, thus contributing to growth and to the stability of
both the Greek and Germany economies.
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